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Summary:
1
Review: Game Theory of Public Goods in One-Shot Social Dilemmas
without Assortment
Marco Archetti 1
, István Scheuring 2
*
1
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, Peter Merian-Weg 6 CH-4002 Basel,
Switzerland
2
Research Group of Theoretical Biology and Ecology, Department of Plant Taxonomy and
Ecology, Eötvös University, Pázmány P. s. 1/C, 1117, Budapest, Hungary
*
E-mail: shieazsf@ludens.elte.hu
Abstract
We review the theory of public goods in biology. In the N-person prisoner's dilemma,
where the public good is a linear function of the individual contributions, cooperation
requires some form of assortment, due for example to kin discrimination, population
viscosity or repeated interactions. In most social species ranging from bacteria to humans,
however, public goods are usually a non-linear function of the contributions, which makes
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