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Summary: Towards a Formal Treatment of Secrecy
against Computational Adversaries
Angelo Troina1
, Alessandro Aldini2
, and Roberto Gorrieri3
1
Dipartimento di Informatica, University of Pisa,
Via F. Buonarroti 2, 56127 - Pisa, Italy
troina@di.unipi.it
2
Istituto STI, University of Urbino,
Piazza della Repubblica 13, 61029 - Urbino, Italy
aldini@sti.uniurb.it
3
Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Informazione, University of Bologna,
Mura Anteo Zamboni 7, 40127 - Bologna, Italy
gorrieri@cs.unibo.it
Abstract. Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view
of cryptography have additional capabilities that the classical Dolev-Yao
adversary model does not include. To relate these two different models of
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