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Justifying Practical Reasoning Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon and Peter McBurney1
 

Summary: Justifying Practical Reasoning
Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon and Peter McBurney1
Abstract. In this paper we discuss arguments embodying practical
reasoning -- arguments as to what it is sensible for someone to do
in a given situation. We draw attention to differences between practi-
cal reasoning and reasoning about beliefs, and suggest that practical
arguments should be treated as a species of presumptive reasoning,
best handled using argumentation schemes and associated critical
questions. We extend the argument scheme for practical reasoning
and its critical questions proposed by Walton, and relate this to our
previous work. We discuss an implementation of this approach, and
then describe a particular application which makes use of the lessons
learned.
1 INTRODUCTION
Although many of the arguments that are deployed in everyday life
are concerned with what it is sensible or practical to do, the topic of
practical reasoning has been rather neglected by philosophers. Prac-
tical reasoning has, of course, been addressed (see, e.g.. [7] for a col-
lection of essays and [8] for a recent monograph), but it has received
nothing like the attention that has been paid to reasoning about be-

  

Source: Atkinson, Katie - Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool
McBurney, Peter - Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences