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Fault-Based Attack of RSA Authentication Andrea Pellegrini, Valeria Bertacco and Todd Austin
 

Summary: Fault-Based Attack of RSA Authentication
Andrea Pellegrini, Valeria Bertacco and Todd Austin
University of Michigan
{apellegrini, valeria, austin}@umich.edu
ABSTRACT
For any computing system to be secure, both hardware and soft-
ware have to be trusted. If the hardware layer in a secure system
is compromised, not only it would be possible to extract secret in-
formation about the software, but it would also be extremely hard
for the software to detect that an attack is underway. In this work
we detail a complete end-to-end fault-attack on a microprocessor
system and practically demonstrate how hardware vulnerabilities
can be exploited to target secure systems. We developed a theo-
retical attack to the RSA signature algorithm, and we realized it
in practice against an FPGA implementation of the system under
attack. To perpetrate the attack, we inject transient faults in the tar-
get machine by regulating the voltage supply of the system. Thus,
our attack does not require access to the victim system's internal
components, but simply proximity to it.
The paper makes three important contributions: first, we develop

  

Source: Austin, Todd M. - Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan
Bertacco, Valeria - Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences; Engineering