Home

About

Advanced Search

Browse by Discipline

Scientific Societies

E-print Alerts

Add E-prints

E-print Network
FAQHELPSITE MAPCONTACT US


  Advanced Search  

 
Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling
 

Summary: Decentralization and Mechanism Design for
Online Machine Scheduling
Birgit Heydenreich , Rudolf M¨uller, and Marc Uetz
Maastricht University, Quantitative Economics, P.O.Box 616,
6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Email: {b.heydenreich,r.muller,m.uetz}@ke.unimaas.nl
Abstract We study the online version of the classical parallel machine
scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from
a new perspective: We assume that the data of each job, namely its re-
lease date rj, its processing time pj and its weight wj is only known to
the job itself, but not to the system. Furthermore, we assume a decen-
tralized setting where jobs choose the machine on which they want to
be processed themselves. We study this problem from the perspective
of algorithmic mechanism design. We introduce the concept of a myopic
best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the dominant strategy
equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. We present a polyno-
mial time, online scheduling mechanism that, assuming rational behavior
of jobs, results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive. The
mechanism deploys an online payment scheme that induces rational jobs
to truthfully report their private data. We also show that the underly-

  

Source: Al Hanbali, Ahmad - Department of Applied Mathematics, Universiteit Twente

 

Collections: Engineering