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Selfish Behavior and Stability of the Internet: A GameTheoretic Analysis of TCP
 

Summary: Selfish Behavior and Stability of the Internet:
A Game≠Theoretic Analysis of TCP 
Aditya Akella, Srinivasan Seshan
CMU
Richard Karp, Scott Shenker
Christos Papadimitriou
ICSI/UC Berkeley
ABSTRACT
For years, the conventional wisdom [7, 22] has been that the con-
tinued stability of the Internet depends on the widespread deploy-
ment of \socially responsible" congestion control. In this paper,
we seek to answer the following fundamental question: If network
end-points behaved in a sel sh manner, would the stability of the
Internet be endangered?
We evaluate the impact of greedy end-point behavior through
a game-theoretic analysis of TCP. In this \TCP Game" each ow
attempts to maximize the throughput it achieves by modifying
its congestion control behavior. We use a combination of analysis
and simulation to determine the Nash Equilibrium of this game.
Our question then reduces to whether the network operates e∆-

  

Source: Akella, Aditya - Department of Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin at Madison

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences