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Revisiting Collusion in Routing Games: a Load Balancing Problem
 

Summary: Revisiting Collusion in Routing Games: a Load
Balancing Problem
Eitan Altman
INRIA-Sophia Antipolis
France
Email: eitan.altman@sophia.inria.fr
Hisao Kameda
University of Tsukuba
Japan
Email: kameda@cs.tsukuba.ac.jp
Yezekael Hayel
University of Avignon France
Email: yezekael.hayel@univ-avignon.fr
Abstract--Is it profitable for players to unite and merge to a
single player? Obviously, the sum of utilities at an equilibrium
cannot exceed the sum obtained if all players join together. But
what happens if only a subset of players join together? Previous
work on collusion have already shown that the society may either
gain or loose from collusion of a subset of players. In this paper
we show for a simple load balancing example that not only the

  

Source: Altman, Eitan.- Projet Maestro, Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis
Paris-Sud XI, Université de - Institut d'Optique, Laboratoire Charles-Fabry, Groupe d'Optique Atomique

 

Collections: Engineering; Physics