Summary: conceptualized in terms of physical concepts and neural
properties as conceptualized in terms of qualitative con-
cepts. It is not necessary to countenance a dualism
Although the strategy of using conceptual dualism to
counter objections is appealing, it remains to be seen
whether it is applicable in all cases. In applying the
strategy, it is generally necessary to assume that one
or another of our various forms of cognitive access to
qualia (introspective awareness, imagination, expect-
ation, etc.) involves conceptualization. As we saw
in connection with the reply to the grain argument, it
is not always clear that assumptions of this sort are
CHRISTOPHER S. HILL
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