Summary: International Journal of Information Security manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Alessandro Aldini · Alessandra Di Pierro
Estimating the Maximum Information Leakage
Abstract Preventing improper information leaks is a
greatest challenge of the modern society. In this paper
we present a technique for measuring the ability of sev-
eral families of adversaries to set up a covert channel.
Our approach relies on a noninterference based formu-
lation of security which can be naturally expressed by
semantic models of the program execution. In our analy-
sis the most powerful adversary is measured via a notion
of approximate process equivalence. Even if finding the
most powerful adversary is in general impractical, we
show that this requires only a finite number of checks
for a particular family of adversaries which are related
to a probabilistic information flow property.
Keywords Covert Channels · Approximate Nonin-
terference · Probabilistic Models · Process Algebra ·