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23 Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
 

Summary: 10/8/2010
1
23 Asymmetric information: silence,
signaling and suffering education
We may know different things about the
lit f itquality of an item.
The signal we give may tell the other how we
value it.
A good signal needs to be differentially costly
across typesacross types.
Example
Cournot games competing in quantities
Each firm as marginal costsg
cost = costMid +| e
Each player knows his own costs. Opponent can reveal his
costs.
Suppose you know both costs, but your opponent does not.
Suppose it costs no money to reveal costs. Should you do
it?
O l l if l IfI h l I h Only reveal costs if lower. IfI have low costs, I want the

  

Source: Allan, Vicki H. - Department of Computer Science, Utah State University

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences