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Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA Vol. 94, pp. 51675171, May 1997
 

Summary: Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
Vol. 94, pp. 5167­5171, May 1997
Evolution
Population dynamics, demographic stochasticity, and the
evolution of cooperation
MICHAEL DOEBELI, ALBERT BLARER, AND MARTIN ACKERMANN
Zoology Institute, University of Basel, Rheinsprung 9, CH-4051 Basel, Switzerland
Communicated by Robert M. May, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, March 17, 1997 (received for review December 11, 1996)
ABSTRACT A basic evolutionary problem posed by the
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is to understand when the
paradigmatic cooperative strategy Tit-for-Tat can invade a
population of pure defectors. Deterministically, this is impos-
sible. We consider the role of demographic stochasticity by
embedding the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma into a population
dynamic framework. Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of
defectors when their dynamics exhibit short episodes of high
population densities with subsequent crashes and long low
density periods with strong genetic drift. Such dynamics tend
to have reddened power spectra and temporal distributions of
population size that are asymmetric and skewed toward low

  

Source: Ackermann, Martin - Institut für Integrative Biologie, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (ETHZ)
Doebeli, Michael - Departments of Zoology & Mathematics, University of British Columbia

 

Collections: Biology and Medicine