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Yale Lectures 21 and 22 21. Repeated Games: Cooperation vs
 

Summary: 10/7/2010
1
Yale Lectures 21 and 22
21. Repeated Games: Cooperation vs
th E d Gthe End Game
Most relationships are not contractual.
Between nations, no court to take it to.
In ongoing relationships, the promise of future rewards and the
threat of future punishments MAY sometimes provide incentives for
good behavior today But for this to work it helps to have a futuregood behavior today. But for this to work, it helps to have a future.
End effects: lame duck, retirement, economics major's
relationships
Repeated interaction does not induce cooperation in a finite period
game.
We can sustain equilibrium even if finite game, but it requiresWe can sustain equilibrium even if finite game, but it requires
multiple equilbrium, can use one as a reward and one as a
punishment. Can use that difference to encourage cooperation
today.
10/7/2010
2

  

Source: Allan, Vicki H. - Department of Computer Science, Utah State University

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences