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On Revenue Maximization in Second-Price Ad Auctions
 

Summary: On Revenue Maximization in
Second-Price Ad Auctions
Yossi Azar1
, Benjamin Birnbaum2
, Anna R. Karlin2
, and C. Thach Nguyen2
1
Microsoft Research and Tel-Aviv University
azar@tau.ac.il
2
University of Washington
@cs.washington.edu
Abstract. Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of al-
locating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions
assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction, which does not re-
alistically model the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used in
practice. Towards the goal of more realistically modeling these auctions,
we introduce the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which bidders'
payments are determined by the GSP mechanism. We show that the
complexity of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is quite different

  

Source: Anderson, Richard - Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Washington at Seattle

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences