Advanced Search

Browse by Discipline

Scientific Societies

E-print Alerts

Add E-prints

E-print Network

  Advanced Search  

Revisiting Collusion in Routing Games: a Load Balancing Eitan Altman

Summary: Revisiting Collusion in Routing Games: a Load Balancing
Eitan Altman
INRIA-Sophia Antipolis
Email: eitan.altman@sophia.inria.fr
Hisao Kameda
University of Tsukuba
Email: kameda@cs.tsukuba.ac.jp
Yezekael Hayel
University of Avignon France
Email: yezekael.hayel@univ-avignon.fr
Abstract--Is it profitable for players to unite and merge to a single
player? Obviously, the sum of utilities at an equilibrium cannot exceed
the sum obtained if all players join together. But what happens if only a
subset of players join together? Previous work on collusion have already
shown that the society may either gain or loose from collusion of a subset
of players. In this paper we show for a simple load balancing example
that not only the society may loose, but also the subset of players that


Source: Altman, Eitan.- Projet Maestro, Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis


Collections: Engineering