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Summary: A DoS-limiting Network Architecture
Xiaowei Yang
University of California, Irvine
xwy@ics.uci.edu
David Wetherall
University of Washington
djw@cs.washington.edu
Thomas Anderson
University of Washington
tom@cs.washington.edu
ABSTRACT
We present the design and evaluation of TVA, a network archi-
tecture that limits the impact of Denial of Service (DoS) floods
from the outset. Our work builds on earlier work on capabilities in
which senders obtain short-term authorizations from receivers that
they stamp on their packets. We address the full range of possible
attacks against communication between pairs of hosts, including
spoofed packet floods, network and host bottlenecks, and router
state exhaustion. We use simulation to show that attack traffic can
only degrade legitimate traffic to a limited extent, significantly out-
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