Home

About

Advanced Search

Browse by Discipline

Scientific Societies

E-print Alerts

Add E-prints

E-print Network
FAQHELPSITE MAPCONTACT US


  Advanced Search  

 
eBay in the Sky: Strategy-Proof Wireless Spectrum Auctions
 

Summary: eBay in the Sky:
Strategy-Proof Wireless Spectrum Auctions
Xia Zhou, Sorabh Gandhi, Subhash Suri and Haitao Zheng
Department of Computer Science
University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA
{xiazhou, sorabh, suri, htzheng}@cs.ucsb.edu
ABSTRACT
Market-driven dynamic spectrum auctions can drastically
improve the spectrum availability for wireless networks strug-
gling to obtain additional spectrum. However, they face sig-
nificant challenges due to the fear of market manipulation.
A truthful or strategy-proof spectrum auction eliminates the
fear by enforcing players to bid their true valuations of the
spectrum. Hence bidders can avoid the expensive overhead
of strategizing over others and the auctioneer can maximize
its revenue by assigning spectrum to bidders who value it
the most. Conventional truthful designs, however, either
fail or become computationally intractable when applied to
spectrum auctions. In this paper, we propose VERITAS, a
truthful and computationally-efficient spectrum auction to

  

Source: Almeroth, Kevin C. - Department of Computer Science, University of California at Santa Barbara

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences