 
Summary: CS 6100 Homework 2
This assignment can be done in groups of one, two or three.
1. In the following strategicform game, what strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies? What are the purestrategy Nash equilibria?
L C R
T 2,0 1,1 4,2
M 3,4 1,2 2,3
B 1,3 0,2 3,0
2. Agents 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split a dollar. Each agent simultaneously names shares
they would like to have (s1 and s2) where 0 s1 1 and 0 s2 1. If s1+s2 1 then both agents
receive the shares they named; if s1+s2 >1, then both agents receive zero. Draw the best response
function for both players (if player 1 picks x, should you player y do if he knew). What are the pure
strategy equilibrium of this game? Hint, to make it easier, consider a fixed set of choices, say
0, .2, .4, .6, .8, 1 for each player.
Hint: A best response function says, "If player A does x, what is player B's response (shown on y
axis)." And conversely, if player B does y, what is player A's response (shown on x axis). It works out
nicely if you can draw both functions on the same set of axis. The point where they cross is
equilibrium.
3. At a fishing booth at a carnival, two children randomly get prizes. There are 5 types of prizes of
varying values. Assume, a prize of type 5 is the best and a prize of type 1 is the worst. They both get a
