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Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms Anna R. Karlin
 

Summary: Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
Anna R. Karlin
University of Washington, Seattle
karlin@cs.washington.edu
David Kempe
University of Southern California
dkempe@usc.edu
Tami Tamir
The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel
tami@idc.ac.il
Abstract
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the
auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a
complex task, and paying them for their work. As com-
mon in the field of mechanism design, we assume that the
agents are selfish and will act in such a way as to maximize
their profit, which in particular may include misrepresent-
ing their true incurred cost. Our first contribution is a new
and natural definition of the frugality ratio of a mechanism,
measuring the amount by which a mechanism "overpays",

  

Source: Anderson, Richard - Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Washington at Seattle

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences