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Prisoners Dilemma rules 1. Binding agreements are not possible.
 

Summary: 11/15/2010
1
Prisoners Dilemma rules
1. Binding agreements are not possible.
N t i P i dil if bi diNote in Prisoners dilemma, if binding
agreements were possible, there would
be no dilemma
2 Utility is given directly to individuals as a2. Utility is given directly to individuals as a
result of individual actions. So, I don't
need to be worried about collective utility.
Solution: cooperative game theory
1
Cooperative Games
· Coalitions ­ set of agents
G d liti ll t k t th· Grand coalition ­ all agents work together
· Characteristic function:
v:2Ag R subsets of agents are
assigned a value.
· Simple coalitional game: a coalition hasSimple coalitional game: a coalition has
value 0 or 1. A voting system can be

  

Source: Allan, Vicki H. - Department of Computer Science, Utah State University

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences