| | |
Summary: Stimulating Cooperative Diversity in Wireless Ad
Hoc Networks through Pricing
Naveen Shastry and Raviraj S. Adve
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto
10 King's College Road, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G4, Canada
Email: {naveen.shastry@utoronto.ca,rsadve@comm.utoronto.ca}
Abstract-- This paper addresses the issue of stimulating coop-
erative diversity among selfish nodes in commercial wireless ad
hoc networks. For the relay, cooperation represents both a real
cost of energy expenditure and an opportunity cost of possible
delays for its own data. Since nodes are selfish, we propose a
pricing game that stimulates cooperation via reimbursements to
the relay. Specifically, given the price per channel use, the source
and relay interact through reimbursement prices, transmitter
power control and forwarding/protocol preferences such that
their utilities are maximized. Our pricing game is shown to
converge to a Nash equilibrium where cooperative diversity is
induced at intuitively reasonable network geometries.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless ad hoc network consists of a set of nodes that
|
