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Summary: Social opportunities and the evolution of fairness
Jean-Baptiste Andr´e1
and Nicolas Baumard2
June 14, 2011
1. Laboratoire Ecologie et Evolution, UMR 7625, CNRS - Ecole Normale Sup´erieure,
46 rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris, France.
Email: jeanbaptisteandre@gmail.com ; phone: +33-1-44322341
2. Institute of cognitive and evolutionary anthropology, University of Oxford
Email: nbaumard@gmail.com
Short title: Evolution of fairness
1
Evolution of fairness 2
Abstract1
We model the evolution of the division of a resource between two individuals,2
according to a bargaining mechanism akin to the ultimatum game, in which a3
dominant proposer makes an offer that his partner can only accept or refuse.4
Individuals are randomly drawn from an infinite population and paired two-5
by-two. In each pair, a proposer is chosen. The proposer offers a division of6
resources to his partner. If the offer is accepted it is implemented; otherwise7
both partners pay a cost and move on to the next social opportunity. When8
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