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Summary: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS--PART B: CYBERNETICS, VOL. 39, NO. 6, DECEMBER 2009 1393
Cooperative Control and Potential Games
Jason R. Marden, Gürdal Arslan, and Jeff S. Shamma
Abstract--We present a view of cooperative control using the
language of learning in games. We review the game-theoretic
concepts of potential and weakly acyclic games, and demonstrate
how several cooperative control problems, such as consensus and
dynamic sensor coverage, can be formulated in these settings.
Motivated by this connection, we build upon game-theoretic con-
cepts to better accommodate a broader class of cooperative control
problems. In particular, we extend existing learning algorithms to
accommodate restricted action sets caused by the limitations of
agent capabilities and group-based decision making. Furthermore,
we also introduce a new class of games called sometimes weakly
acyclic games for time-varying objective functions and action
sets, and provide distributed algorithms for convergence to an
equilibrium.
Index Terms--Cooperative control, game theory, learning in
games, multi-agent systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
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