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f /Preference elicitation/ iterative mechanisms
 

Summary: 11/8/2010
1
f /Preference elicitation/
iterative mechanisms
Adapted from notes by Vincent ConitzerAdapted from notes by Vincent Conitzer
"Much effort has been spent on developing algorithms for the
hard problem of winner determination once bids have
been received. Yet, preference elicitation has emerged as
perhaps the key bottleneck in the real-world deployment of
combinatorial auctions. Advanced clearing algorithms are
worthless if one cannot simplify the bidding problem facing
bidders." ---David Parkes
Concerns:
Communication cost of sending bids
Cost to bidders to determine valuation on different
bundles. Give an example where bundle valuation
is difficult for the bidder.
Agents may prefer NOT to reveal their valuation
information
11/8/2010

  

Source: Allan, Vicki H. - Department of Computer Science, Utah State University

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences