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Games and Mechanism Design in Machine Scheduling -An Introduction
 

Summary: Games and Mechanism Design in Machine Scheduling -
An Introduction
Birgit Heydenreich
Rudolf M¨uller Marc Uetz
Maastricht University, Quantitative Economics,
P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
E-mail: {b.heydenreich,r.muller,m.uetz}@ke.unimaas.nl
Abstract
In this paper, we survey different models, techniques, and some recent results to tackle ma-
chine scheduling problems within a distributed setting. In traditional optimization, a central
authority is asked to solve a (computationally hard) optimization problem. In contrast, in
distributed settings there are several agents, possibly equipped with private information that
is not publicly known, and these agents need to interact in order to derive a solution to the
problem. Usually the agents have their individual preferences, which induces them to behave
strategically in order to manipulate the resulting solution. Nevertheless, one is often interested
in the global performance of such systems. The analysis of such distributed settings requires
techniques from classical Optimization, Game Theory, and Economic Theory. The paper there-
fore briefly introduces the most important of the underlying concepts, and gives a selection of
typical research questions and recent results, focussing on applications to machine scheduling
problems. This includes the study of the so-called price of anarchy for settings where the agents

  

Source: Al Hanbali, Ahmad - Department of Applied Mathematics, Universiteit Twente

 

Collections: Engineering