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NETWORK DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT WITH STRATEGIC A Dissertation
 

Summary: NETWORK DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT WITH STRATEGIC
AGENTS
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Elliot Anshelevich
July 2005
c 2005 Elliot Anshelevich
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
NETWORK DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT WITH STRATEGIC AGENTS
Elliot Anshelevich, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2005
Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects
of strategic behavior. Given a collection of self-interested agents who want to form a network
connecting certain endpoints, the set of stable solutions (the Nash equilibria) may look quite
different from the centrally enforced optimum. We study the price of stability, i.e., the quality of
the best Nash equilibrium compared to the optimum network cost. The best Nash equilibrium

  

Source: Anshelevich, Elliot - Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences