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Conditional probability and defeasible inference Horacio Arlo Costa (hcosta@andrew.cmu.edu)

Summary: Conditional probability and defeasible inference
Horacio Arlīo Costa (hcosta@andrew.cmu.edu)
Carnegie Mellon University
Philosophy Department
Pittsburgh, P.A. 15213
Rohit Parikh (ripbc@cunyvm.cuny.edu)
CUNY Graduate Center
Department of Computer Science
365 Fifth Avenue
New York NY 10016-4309
Abstract. We offer a probabilistic model of rational consequence relations (Lehmann
and Magidor, 1990) by appealing to the extension of the classical Ramsey-Adams
test proposed by Vann McGee in (McGee, 1994). Previous and influential models of
non-monotonic consequence relations have been produced in terms of the dynamics
of expectations (GĻardenfors and Makinson, 1994), (GĻardenfors, 1993). `Expectation'
is a term of art in these models, which should not be confused with the notion of
expected utility. The expectations of an agent are some form of belief weaker than
absolute certainty. Our model offers a modified and extended version of an account of
qualitative belief in terms of conditional probability, first presented in (van Fraassen,


Source: Andrews, Peter B. - Department of Mathematical Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University


Collections: Mathematics