 
Summary: CS 6890 Homework 3 (20 points)
Written homework provides an excellent framework for achieving the goals of this course. Because
assignments are done as a group and any questions are discussed in class or during office hours,
written solutions to the homework will not be provided. These are typed exercises, but you are
certainly encouraged to actually program some of them. Be sure to show your work for all the
problems.Note, these exercises may be done in groups of one or two (or with instructor approval,
three). If more than one person is involved, list all the names on ONE set of answers. Groups may
change throughout the semester. Answers should not be compared with others not in your group.
1. Consider the bimatrix game below: Find the (interior) Nash equilibrium with mixed strategies. Do
the problem two ways. Once with partial derivatives (like on page 71) and once the way we first used
in class [by setting each players pure strategy utilities equal to each other].
2. Consider the bimatrix game below: Find the (interior) Nash equilibrium with mixed strategies. Do
the problem two ways. Once with partial derivatives (like on page 71) and once the way we first used
in class. You haven't seen an example quite like this, but its just more of the 2x2 case. The book has
some examples.
3. Find the Nash equilibrium of a twoperson strategic form game with strategy sets S1 = S2 = R
4. Apply iterated elimination of dominated strategies to the following three person game for players r,
c, and t. When a strategy is dominated, indicated ALL strategies that dominate it and whether the
domination is strict or weak. Recall, weak domination means that all entries are greater or equal to
all choices of the dominated option. Make sure you eliminate all dominated strategies before reducing
