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TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions
 

Summary: TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double
Spectrum Auctions
Xia Zhou and Heather Zheng
Department of Computer Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106
xiazhou,htzheng@cs.ucsb.edu
Abstract-- We design truthful double spectrum auctions where
multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual
needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing
spectrum owners (as sellers) to lease their selected idle spectrum
to new spectrum users, and provides new users (as buyers) the
spectrum they desperately need. The most significant challenge is
how to make the auction economic-robust (truthful in particular)
while enabling spectrum reuse to improve spectrum utilization.
Unfortunately, existing designs either do not consider spectrum
reuse or become untruthful when applied to double spectrum auc-
tions. We address this challenge by proposing TRUST, a general
framework for truthful double spectrum auctions. TRUST takes
as input any reusability-driven spectrum allocation algorithm,
and applies a novel winner determination and pricing mechanism
to achieve truthfulness and other economic properties while sig-

  

Source: Almeroth, Kevin C. - Department of Computer Science, University of California at Santa Barbara

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences