Summary: CS 6890 Homework 2 (20 points)
Written homework provides an excellent framework for achieving the goals of this course. Because
assignments are done as a group and any questions are discussed in class or during office hours,
written solutions to the homework will not be provided. These are typed (or printed clearly) exercises,
but you are certainly encouraged to actually program some of them. Be sure to show your work for all
Note, these exercises may be done in groups of one or two (or with instructor approval, three). If
more than one person is involved, list all the names on ONE set of answers. Groups may change
throughout the semester. Answers should not be compared with others not in your group.
1. In the following strategic-form game, what strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly-
dominated strategies? What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria?
L C R
T 2,0 1,1 4,2
M 3,4 1,2 2,3
B 1,3 0,2 3,0
2. Agents 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split a dollar. Each agent simultaneously name shares
they would like to have (s1 and s2) where 0 s1 1 and 0 s2 1. If s1+s2 1 then both agents
receive the shares they named; if s1+s2 >1, then both agents receive zero. What are the pure strategy
equilibrium of this game?
3. Prove that if strategies (s1,s2,s3...sn) are a Nash equilibrium in a strategic form game, then they