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Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Selfish Related Machines #
 

Summary: Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling
Selfish Related Machines #
Nir Andelman + Yossi Azar # Motti Sorani §
March 22, 2005
Abstract
We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents. Pre­
viously, Archer and Tardos showed a 2­approximation randomized mechanism which is truthful
in expectation only (a weaker notion of truthfulness). We provide a 5­approximation determin­
istic truthful mechanism, the first deterministic truthful result for the problem.
In case the number of machines is constant, we provide a deterministic Fully Polynomial
Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) algorithm, and a suitable payment scheme that yields a
truthful mechanism for the problem. This result, which is based on converting FPTAS to mono­
tone FPTAS, improves a previous result of Auletta et al, who showed a (4 + #)­approximation
truthful mechanism.
1 Introduction
The emergence of the Internet as the platform for distributed computation changed the point of
view of the algorithm designer [14, 15]. The old implicit assumption that the participating machines
(agents) act as instructed can no longer be taken for granted. As the machines over the Internet are
controlled by di#erent users, they are likely to do what is most beneficial to their owners, manipulate
the system and lie when it is possible to maximize their own profit. Where optimization problems

  

Source: Azar, Yossi - School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences