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Summary: R E V I E W
0166-2236/99/$ see front matter © 1999 Elsevier Science. All rights reserved. PII: S0166-2236(98)01376-9 TINS Vol. 22, No. 7, 1999 303
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE hinges on the doctrine
that the brain represents the world in patterns of
neuronal activity. Recently, this `representationalist'
credo was forcefully restated by Blakemore and
Movshon1
. `The task of sensory systems is to provide a
faithful representation of biologically relevant events
in the external environment... These representations
are [rich] because they contain representations of
objects, states, and events that are abstracted from the
primitive sensory signals; they are [simple] because
they represent the distillation of the vast quantities of
raw measurement information offered to the central
nervous system by each sensory surface.' As early as
four decades ago Lettvin et al.2
anticipated this credo in
the classical paper `What the frog's eye tells the frog's
brain', which phrased the neuronal sensitivities of
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