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Summary: Value-Based Arguments in the Dictator Game
Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon
Department of Computer Science
University of Liverpool
Liverpool L69 3BX, UK
{katie,tbc}@csc.liv.ac.uk
Abstract
In this paper we use an approach to modelling reasoning in
a simple scenario from experimental economics, called the
Dictator Game, using preferences over social values to pro-
vide transparent justification of actions. Our approach to de-
cision making here does not require estimation of utilities and
weights for different factors and can thus allow preferences to
emerge from the reasoning. Using this model we can explain
the behaviour of subjects in such experiments, and, in partic-
ular, gain insight into the framing effect observed by some
experimenters, which is difficult to explain in terms of max-
imising expected utilities.
Introduction
The Dictator Game (DG) is a very simple game or more
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