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Summary: QAPL 2004 Preliminary Version
On Quantitative Analysis of
Probabilistic Protocols
Alessandro Aldini 1
Istituto STI, Universit`a Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy
Alessandra Di Pierro 2
Dipartimento di Informatica, Universit`a di Pisa, Italy
Abstract
We advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of
probabilistic protocols. Our approach relies on a formalisation of the protocol in
the setting of a probabilistic process algebra and a notion of process similarity based
on weak probabilistic bisimulation. We illustrate this approach by presenting the
analysis of a probabilistic nonrepudiation protocol which allows us to quantitatively
estimate its fairness degree.
Key words: Approximate Noninterference, Case Study, Process
Equivalence, Probabilistic Process Algebra
1 Introduction
Security services such as authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, etc.
are nowadays crucial to many applications given the growing importance of
open networks. Thus the study of security protocols that guarantee such
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