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Coalitional Game Theory for Security Risk Management Walid Saad1, Tansu Alpcan2, Tamer Basar3, and Are Hjrungnes1
 

Summary: Coalitional Game Theory for Security Risk Management
Walid Saad1, Tansu Alpcan2, Tamer Bas¸ar3, and Are Hjørungnes1
1
UNIK - University Graduate Center, University of Oslo, Kjeller, Norway, Email: {saad,arehj}@unik.no
2
Deutsche Telekom Laboratories, Berlin, Germany, Email: tansu.alpcan@telekom.de
3
Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA, Email: basar1@illinois.edu
Abstract--Quantitative models for security risk management in
organizations are recently receiving an increased attention in the
research community. This paper investigates the possibility of
cooperation among autonomous divisions of an organization with
dependent security assets and/or vulnerabilities for reducing overall
security risks. A coalitional game is formulated for modeling cooper-
ation possibilities among these divisions based on their both positive
(synergies) and negative (vulnerabilities) interdependencies. The pro-
posed game constitutes a framework that allows to investigate how
an organization can maximize its total utility through cooperation
among its different divisions. The introduced utility accounts for the
gains from cooperation, in terms of an improved synergy among the

  

Source: Alpcan, Tansu - Deutsche Telekom Laboratories & Technische Universität Berlin

 

Collections: Engineering