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DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9066-4 ORIGINAL PAPER

Summary: Synthese
DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9066-4
Carnap's dream: Gödel, Wittgenstein,
and Logical Syntax
S. Awodey · A. W. Carus
Received: 23 May 2005 / Accepted: 12 June 2006
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006
Abstract In Carnap's autobiography, he tells the story how one night in January
1931, "the whole theory of language structure" in all its ramifications "came to [him]
like a vision". The shorthand manuscript he produced immediately thereafter, he says,
"was the first version" of Logical Syntax of Language. This document, which has never
been examined since Carnap's death, turns out not to resemble Logical Syntax at all,
at least on the surface. Wherein, then, did the momentous insight of 21 January 1931
consist? We seek to answer this question by placing Carnap's shorthand manuscript
in the context of his previous efforts to accommodate scientific theories and meta-
linguistic claims within Wittgenstein's Tractatus theory of meaning. The breakthrough
of January 1931 consists, from this viewpoint, in the rejection of the Tractatus theory
in favor of the meta-mathematical perspective of Hilbert, Gödel, and Tarski. This was
not yet the standpoint of the published Logical Syntax, as we show, but led naturally


Source: Andrews, Peter B. - Department of Mathematical Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University


Collections: Mathematics