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On robustness and dynamics in (un)balanced coalitional games We build upon control theoretic concepts like robustness and dynamics to better ac-
 

Summary: On robustness and dynamics in (un)balanced coalitional games
D. Bauso
J. Timmer
Abstract
We build upon control theoretic concepts like robustness and dynamics to better ac-
commodate all the situations where the coalitions' values are uncertain and subject to
changes over time. The proposed robust dynamic framework provides an alternative per-
spective on the study of sequences of coalitional games or interval valued games. For a
sequence of coalitional games, either balanced or unbalanced, we analyze the key roles
of instantaneous and average games. Instantaneous games are obtained by freezing the
coalitions' values at a given time and come into play when coalitions' values are known.
On the other hand, average games are derived from averaging the coalitions' values up
to a given time and are key part of our analysis when coalitions' values are unknown.
The main theoretical contribution of our paper is a design method of allocation rules that
return solutions in the core and/or -core of the instantaneous and average games. Theo-
retical results are then specialized to a simulated example to shed light on the impact of
the design method and on the performance of the resulting allocation rules.
Keywords cooperative games, dynamic games, unbalancedness.
1 Introduction
In this work, we investigate robustness and dynamics in coalitional games. We build upon

  

Source: Al Hanbali, Ahmad - Department of Applied Mathematics, Universiteit Twente

 

Collections: Engineering