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Summary: Formalization of Security Proofs Using PVS in
the Dolev-Yao Model
Rodrigo B. Nogueira2,3, Anderson C. do Nascimento2,3, Flavio L.C. de
Moura1,2, and Mauricio Ayala-Rincon1,2
1 Grupo de Teoria da Computac~ao, Departamentos de Matematica,
2 Ci^encia da Computac~ao and
3 Engenharia Eletrica, Universidade de Braslia, Braslia D.F., Brasil
rodrigo.nogueira@dprf.gov.br,{andclay@ene,flavio@cic,ayala@}unb.br
Abstract. The security analysis of cryptographic protocols is a dicult
issue. We can nd many examples in the literature of protocols once be-
lieved to be secure and later proven to be
awed. The Dolev-Yao model
came as a simple and useful framework to study the security of crypto-
graphic protocols. In this study we report on a mechanical veri cation
of the security characterization of a class of protocols in the Dolev-Yao
model (two-party cascade protocols) following an algebraic speci cation
approach with the Prototype Veri cation System PVS.
1 Introduction
Motivation. Even assuming perfectly secure cryptographic primitives, the se-
curity analysis of cryptographic protocols is a tricky issue. Proofs of security
are rather dicult to check and there are many cases reported in the literature
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