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MEFISTO 2003 Preliminary Version Approximating Imperfect Cryptography
 

Summary: MEFISTO 2003 Preliminary Version
Approximating Imperfect Cryptography
in a Formal Model
Angelo Troina 1
Dipartimento di Informatica, Universit`a di Pisa, Italy
Alessandro Aldini 2
Istituto STI, Universit`a Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy
Roberto Gorrieri 3
Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Informazione, Universit`a di Bologna, Italy
Abstract
We present a formal view of cryptography that overcomes the usual assumptions
of formal models for reasoning about security of computer systems, i.e. perfect cryp-
tography and Dolev-Yao adversary model. In our framework, equivalence among
formal cryptographic expressions is parameterized by a computational adversary
that may exploit weaknesses of the cryptosystem to cryptanalyze ciphertext with
a certain probability of success. To validate our approach, we show that in the
restricted setting of ideal cryptosystems, for which the probability of guessing infor-
mation that the Dolev-Yao adversary cannot derive is negligible, the computational
adversary is limited to the allowed behaviors of the Dolev-Yao adversary.
1 Introduction

  

Source: Aldini, Alessandro - Dipartimento di Matematica, Fisica e Informatica, Universita’ di Urbino "Carlo Bo"

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences