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Belief revision conditionals: basic iterated Horacio Arl o-Costa 1

Summary: Belief revision conditionals: basic iterated
Horacio Arlo-Costa 1
Carnegie Mellon University, Philosophy,
Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot
be identi ed with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising
impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gardenfors showed
in [13] that believing `If A then B' cannot be equated with the act of believing B on
the supposition that A { as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints.
Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question `how to
accept a conditional?' has a clear answer. Even if conditionals are not truth-carriers,
they do have precise acceptability conditions. Nevertheless most epistemic models
of conditionals do not provide acceptance conditions for iterated conditionals. One
of the main goals of this essay is to provide a comprehensive account of the notion
of epistemic conditionality covering all forms of iteration.
First we propose an account of the basic idea of epistemic conditionality, by
studying the conditionals validated by epistemic models where iteration is permit-


Source: Andrews, Peter B. - Department of Mathematical Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University


Collections: Mathematics