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Received 25 November 2005 Revised 6 March 2006
 

Summary: Received 25 November 2005
Revised 6 March 2006
Copyright 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 1 June 2006
A game-theoretic model for capacity-constrained fair
bandwidth allocation
Yonghe Yan, Adel El-Atawy*
and Ehab Al-Shaer
School of Computing, DePaul University, Chicago, IL 60604, USA
SUMMARY
Data stream providers face a hard decision to satisfy the requirements of their subscribers. Each user has a minimum
and a maximum required bandwidth. The server should be able to decide which requests can be satisfied and how
much bandwidth will be allocated to each. We present a theoretical framework in a distributed mechanism for fair
bandwidth allocation on a network with various bottleneck links. In our model, a user is guaranteed a minimum
bandwidth and charged a price for the bandwidth allocated. A utility function is defined over the allocated band-
width for a specific maximum requested bandwidth. We then present a non-cooperative game with social welfare
function to resolve users' conflicting bandwidth capacity requests at bottleneck links. We also show that our pro-
posed game-theoretic solution guarantees fair bandwidth allocation as defined in our residual capacity fairness. In
order to guarantee the minimum bandwidth requirement, we integrate an admission control mechanism in our
solution. However, global optimal admission conditions are not easy to implement for large networks. Therefore,
we propose a distributed admission scheme. As a result, the paper presents fair and practical distributed algorithms

  

Source: Al-Shaer, Ehab - School of Computer Science, Telecommunications and Information Systems, DePaul University

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences