Summary: Spatio-temporal control for Dynamic Routing Games
M. K. Hanawal,1, E. Altman, R. El-Azouzi1 and B.J. Prabhu2,3
Maestro group, INRIA, 2004 Route des Lucioles, Sophia Antipolis, France
1LIA, University of Avignon, 339, chemin des Meinajaries, Avignon, France
2 CNRS; LAAS; 7 avenue du Colonel Roche, F-31077 Toulouse, France.
3 Universit´e de Toulouse; UPS, INSA, INP, ISAE; LAAS; F-31077 Toulouse, France.
In this paper, we study dynamic routing games where the decision of an user is spatio-temporal control. Each user ships its
demand over time on a shared resource. We investigate the equilibrium of such systems and show the existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium. In the second part, we study a stochastic congestion games where there is only one shared resource and the
traffic is indivisible. The information structure that we consider is such that each user knows the state of its own buffer but
not aware of states and the actions taken by other users. The game can be described as a game with random environment. We
manage to characterize the structure of equilibria policies using linear programming.
Routing gams are concerned with one or classes of individuals, where each class is characterized by a source-destination
pair and a demand function. A given network is shared by the users. Routes are chosen by the players so as to minimize
the delays. In road traffic engineering, routing games appeared in 1952 . Non-cooperative routing has long been studied
both in the framework of road-traffic as well as in the framework of telecommunication networks. Such frameworks allow
to model the flow configuration that results in networks in which routing decisions are made in a non-cooperative and
distributed manner between the users. There can be finite or infinite number of users.