Home

About

Advanced Search

Browse by Discipline

Scientific Societies

E-print Alerts

Add E-prints

E-print Network
FAQHELPSITE MAPCONTACT US


  Advanced Search  

 
Uncertainty and communication complexity in iterated cooperation games Peter Andras1
 

Summary: Uncertainty and communication complexity in iterated cooperation games
Peter Andras1
1
School of Computing Science, Newcastle University
peter.andras@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract
Iterated cooperation games (e.g. Prisoner's Dilemma) are used
to analyze the emergence and evolution of cooperation among
selfish individuals. Uncertainty of outcomes of games is an
important factor that influences the level of cooperation.
Communication of intentions also has a major impact on the
outcome of situations that may lead to cooperation. Here we
present an agent-based simulation that implements the
uncertainty of outcomes together with the communication of
intentions between agents. This simulation is used to analyze
the relationship between uncertainty and the complexity of the
language that the agents use to communicate about their
intentions. The complexity of the language is measured in
terms of variability of its usage among agents. The results show
that more outcome uncertainty implies lower complexity of the

  

Source: Andras, Peter - School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences