 
Summary:  600 Foster Street
Willemien Kets joined the MEDS department at the Kellogg School of
Management in 2011. Prior to joining MEDS, she was an Omidyar
postdoctoral fellow at the Santa Fe Institute and a visiting scholar at
Stanford University. She received her PhD in economics from Tilburg
University (Netherlands). Her general research interests are in game theory
and microeconomic theory, in particular the modeling of boundedly rational
decision makers. She is also interested in the question how social structure
affects economic outcomes.
http://www.northwestern.edu/nico
NICO is pleased to present:
Willemien Kets
February 22, 2012  12:00 to 01:00 P  Chambers Hall, lower level
Inequality and Network Structure
We explore the manner in which the structure of a social network constrains the
level of inequality that can be sustained among its members, based on the
following considerations: (i) any distribution of value must be stable with respect to
coalitional deviations, and (ii) the network structure itself determines the coalitions
that may form. We show that if players can jointly deviate only if they form a clique
in the network, then the degree of inequality that can be sustained depends on the
