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Summary: Transmission power control game with SINR as
objective function
E. Altman1
, K. Avrachenkov1
, and A. Garnaev2
1
INRIA Sophia Antipolis, France
{altman,k.avrachenkov}@sophia.inria.fr
2
St. Petersburg State University, Russia
agarnaev@rambler.ru
Abstract. We consider the transmission power control problem with
SINR as objective function in the two scenarii: selfish and cooperative.
We show that in the selfish (non-cooperative) scenario several Nash equi-
libria can arise. In particular, the game can take the form of the Hawk-
Dove game, where the users can choose either conciliation or conflict
fighting for shared sub-carriers. We fully characterize different types of
Nash equilibria. In the cooperative scenario, we show that the parameter
area where users employ pure strategies is essentially narrower than the
area where users employ mixed strategies. Moreover, we identify an area
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