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a . J a m e s C l a R k s C H o o l o F e n g i n e e R i n ga . J a m e s C l a R k s C H o o l o F e n g i n e e R i n g CIVILReMARKSC i v i l a n d e n v i R o n m e n t a l e n g i n e e R i n g
 

Summary: a . J a m e s C l a R k s C H o o l o F e n g i n e e R i n ga . J a m e s C l a R k s C H o o l o F e n g i n e e R i n g
CIVILReMARKSC i v i l a n d e n v i R o n m e n t a l e n g i n e e R i n g
T
he failure of the hurricane protection system in New Orleans was
the fact that it was really not a system at all. That's the finding of the
Hurricane Katrina Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force
(IPET) in the final draft of its report.
"The system was a system in name only," says Lewis E. (Ed) Link, a
senior research engineer with CEE and leader of IPET. IPET was established
in October by the Chief of Engineers and is comprised of experts from
government, industry and academia. The goal of the task force is to learn
what happened with regard to flood protection and damage reduction
capability in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, preventing similar
destruction in the future.
According to Link, hurricane protection in New Orleans was designed
and developed in a "piecemeal fashion," resulting in inconsistent levels of
protection. "What this report points out is that you have to look at this as a
system and not just as components of that system," says Link. "You must plan it, design it and create it with all the pieces
working together in a consistent way." In other words, he adds, "If a single levee or floodwall fails, the entire area is
impacted."

  

Source: Aydilek, Ahmet - Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Maryland at College Park

 

Collections: Engineering