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Connections Between Cooperative Control and Potential Games Illustrated on the Consensus Problem
 

Summary: Connections Between Cooperative Control and Potential Games
Illustrated on the Consensus Problem
Jason R. Marden, G¨urdal Arslan and Jeff S. Shamma
Abstract-- This paper presents a view of cooperative control
using the language of learning in games. We review the
game theoretic concepts of potential games and weakly acyclic
games and demonstrate how the specific cooperative control
problem of consensus can be formulated in these settings.
Motivated by this connection, we build upon game theoretic
concepts to better accommodate a broader class of cooperative
control problems. In particular, we introduce sometimes weakly
acyclic games for time-varying objective functions and action
sets, and provide distributed algorithms for convergence to
an equilibrium. Finally, we illustrate how to implement these
algorithms for the consensus problem in a variety of settings,
most notably, in an environment with non-convex obstructions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our goals in this paper are to establish a relationship
between cooperative control problems, such as the consensus
problem, and game theoretic methods, and to demonstrate

  

Source: Arslan, Gürdal - Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Hawai'i at Manoa

 

Collections: Engineering