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Summary: Addressing Moral Problems Through Practical
Reasoning
Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon
Department of Computer Science
University of Liverpool
Liverpool L69 7ZF UK
{katie,tbc}@csc.liv.ac.uk
Abstract. In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral rea-
soning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning
about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms per-
haps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on
our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-
Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought
to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might
be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally
praiseworthy and morally excusable actions.
1 Introduction
In Freedom and Reason [7], R.M. Hare, perhaps the leading British moral philosopher
of the twentieth century, notes that:
"There is a great difference between people in respect of their readiness to
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