Home

About

Advanced Search

Browse by Discipline

Scientific Societies

E-print Alerts

Add E-prints

E-print Network
FAQHELPSITE MAPCONTACT US


  Advanced Search  

 
The Center for Control, Dynamical Systems, and Computation University of California at Santa Barbara
 

Summary: The Center for Control, Dynamical Systems, and Computation
University of California at Santa Barbara
Spring 2008 Seminar Series
Presents
Noncooperative Cooperation
Jason Marden
California Institute of Technology
Friday, April 18, 2008 3:00-4:00pm Harold Frank Hall 1104
Abstract:
In this talk, we present a view of cooperative control using the language of learning in games. We
review the game theoretic concept of potential games and demonstrate how several cooperative
control problems such as routing, rendezvous, and sensor coverage can be formulated in this
setting. Motivated by this connection, we build upon learning in games to better accommodate
a broader class of cooperative control problems. The theory of learning in games has sought to
understand how and why equilibria emerge in non-cooperative games. Traditionally, economists
develop descriptive behavioral models, analyze the limiting behavior, and generalize the results
for large classes of games. In contrast, our focus is on exploiting these models from a prescriptive
point of view, i.e., as adaptive algorithms for large scale distributed systems. This paradigm shift
leads to many challenging problems. For example, in large scale systems many well known
distributed learning algorithms that guarantee convergence to an equilibrium, such as Fictitious

  

Source: Akhmedov, Azer - Department of Mathematics, University of California at Santa Barbara

 

Collections: Mathematics