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Summary: Explicit Communication Revisited:
Two New Attacks on Authentication Protocols
Mart'in Abadi
Systems Research Center
Digital Equipment Corporation
ma@pa.dec.com
March 9, 1997
Abstract
SSH and AKA are recent, practical protocols for secure connections
over an otherwise unprotected network. This paper shows that, despite
the use of publickey cryptography, SSH and AKA do not provide
authentication as intended. The flaws of SSH and AKA can be viewed
as the result of their disregarding a basic principle for the design of
sound authentication protocols: the principle that messages should be
explicit.
1 Introduction
SSH and AKA are two recent, practical protocols for secure connections over
an otherwise unprotected network [Yl¨o96a, SSH96]; for example, they enable
users to log into remote hosts. Both of the protocols rely on publickey
cryptography for authentication (specifically, on RSA [RSA78]). In addition
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