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Summary: A First Step Towards Automated Detection of Buffer Overrun Vulnerabilities
David Wagner Jeffrey S. Foster Eric A. Brewer Alexander Aiken
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
We describe a new technique for finding potential buffer
overrun vulnerabilities in securitycritical C code. The key
to success is to use static analysis: we formulate detec
tion of buffer overruns as an integer range analysis prob
lem. One major advantage of static analysis is that secu
rity bugs can be eliminated before code is deployed. We
have implemented our design and used our prototype to find
new remotelyexploitable vulnerabilities in a large, widely
deployed software package. An earlier hand audit missed
these bugs.
1. Introduction
Buffer overrun vulnerabilities have plagued security ar
chitects for at least a decade. In November 1988, the in
famous Internet worm infected thousands or tens of thou
sands of networkconnected hosts and fragmented much of
the known net [17]. One of the primary replication mecha
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